Thinking about at how New York City government works

Month: April 2021

FAS EST AB HOSTE DOCERI

The use in managerial circles of the term “silo” to mean other than a farm structure is of rather recent coinage. When we were studying at university many decades ago it was an unheard of usage. But the conventional wisdom has become that in large organizations “silos” are bad. 

“Silo mentality is a mindset that exists in organizations, which makes people reluctant to share information and resources with other employees of different departments within the same organization. As a result, it reduces the company’s efficiency and, at worst, contributes to a damaged corporate culture. Also known as silo thinking and silo visionsilo mentality occurs when people think that it’s not their responsibility to communicate with their colleagues or other departments. Silos in business restrict people from taking an interest in the overall success of the company.

The silo mentality mainly arises due to internal competition with other teams or individuals. As this inward-looking attitude grows within each department, it breeds an “us and them” mindset, which invariably has a negative impact on the culture and productivity of the organization as a whole.”

The negative results of organizational silos are said to be i) duplicative work, ii) routine, conformist thinking and iii) a lack of responsiveness to external stakeholders.[1]

Silos, like risk aversion, are a pervasive, systemic phenomenon across New York City government, the result of which is serious, widespread dysfunction. When we first came into public service, among our goals was to take well-considered risks and to encourage as much cooperation among employees in the same business unit, across business units, among agencies and with outside stakeholders as possible. We assumed that with more seniority would come greater capacity for risk taking and collaboration. The reverse was true. The longer we served in City government, the less tolerance there was for unconventional, non-standard managerial practices by the powers that be. Once we were assumed to understand “how things went,” the more we were expected to conform. As years past, we were compelled by the culture to become more risk averse, and less able to work with others (however, we were able to continue to support and encourage our staff to collaborate with each other – the power structure seemed not to care about that and left us to our own devices). Ultimately, all meetings with other agencies and outsiders were subject to the approval of the hierarchy. This forced us to be unresponsive and to resist collaborative problem solving. 

The first reason for the creation of an organizational silo is turf. This is self-imposed by a manager. Mid-level governmental managers have so little decision-making authority and are routinely treated so disrespectfully and arbitrarily by their supervisors that building a tiny fortress is a form of psychological protection. A manager maintains his or her self-respect and sense of autonomy by drawing clearly defined boundaries around their jurisdiction. Those who want to enter the feif must pay appropriate homage to the Lord. Their vassals are, of course, abused (as is the lord by his or herliege). Outsiders are regarded with hostility as a threat to the fortress’ sanctity and safety. If outsiders want something from the manager/Lord they must pay proper obeisance to the power of the Lord and be eternally grateful for their patronage. 

When we first entered City service, among our responsibilities was signing off on routine, ministerial agreements between another City agency and non-governmental institutions. Our role was to check with legal counsel to make sure that the form of the agreement was in good order, make a record of the existence of the document and return it to the originating agency. Our approval was required because this type of agreement tangentially touched on our agency’s jurisdiction and “attention must be paid.” Our performing of this ministerial function was treated by our colleagues at the other agency as a supreme kindness. Before our accession to this responsibility, these documents would sit on various desks for months before being processed. We found it not particularly taxing to process these agreements immediately and ask our legal colleagues to perform their five-minutes of review within days, rather than weeks. 

But this situation was not to continue. The agency changed its policy to remove from our position any signature authority over even the most trivial matters, and to lodge that authority at the highest levels. In order to gain such approval, a series of explanatory memos were required to be created to explain why approval of the agreement by the agency would be appropriate. Even when the correct paperwork was completed, there came a point when the requisite signature was only affixed after a senior executive of the other agency called to inquire as to the status of the document. In one case, such a trivial document languished for over a year between the time it was received by us and time it was returned to be signed to the other agency. For some period of time there was a dispute over the order of signatures to the documents – as to which agency would have the supreme privilege and glory of being the final signatory. Ultimately, when our colleagues at the other agency inquired as to the status of this particular instrument, the inevitable witch hunt was undertaken to determine who was to blame for the delay (this being agreed to be of higher priority than actually finally processing said agreement). 

Perhaps, more importantly, and more destructively, silos exist as a result of the universal importance of credit for “accomplishment.” More specifically, who would be noted in the requisite media release as being most responsible for the described achievement. To collaborate with others is to muddy the waters as to the source of the rare, claimed success. A business unit does not want to share credit with agency colleagues and agency heads wish to reserve credit for such accomplishments for themselves. No right-thinking person, seeking to advance themselves within the bureaucracy or electorally, would ever want to assist someone else in their efforts to achieve something – since all others are seen as participants in the all-essential competition for credit and recognition, particularly from the media. 

Collaborating with external stakeholders exposes the decision maker to the potential for criticism. Perhaps a stakeholder is politically disfavored by the powers that be, and the manager will be cast into darkness by cooperating with that person. Perhaps the stakeholder has unknown baggage attached to them. Within the bureaucracy, all private sector actors are suspect as self-interested liars (as so many of them are, in point of fact). One can never really know – so why get involved with assisting someone (unless they are a well-established “good guy,” often a lobbyist. The phenomenon of the designation as a “good guy,” we will perhaps discuss in a future writing. Suffice it to say that the principal attribute of “good guy-ness” is familiarity –longevity within or dealing with the bureaucracy)? We have been known to say that of the more than 300,000 municipal employees, not one has the time to return a phone call from someone outside government. The reason they do not do so is that there is little to no upside in returning the call of non-governmental actors (other than lobbyists). 

This culture obviously impedes innovation and creative, collaborative problem solving. But without even going that far, reversing of siloed behavior requires remarkably little effort, and little to no actual sacrifice by the parties involved. Returning a phone call is easy. Providing information that is simple for the manager to access, may save the caller hours of research and the possibility of reaching the wrong conclusion. Collaboration prevents duplication of effort among agencies. It enables dedicated public servants to share ideas and be more likely to solve critical problems when all of the requisite information is available to the decision makers as a result of broad collaboration. It takes effort to create silos. Behaving cooperatively is actually easier. You have to work at making silos. 

We were once asked by a colleague at another agency for a brief meeting to review a small, relatively unimportant but imaginative project they had under consideration. The project had the potential for being integrated with an initiative our agency had underway. The caller was a talented and friendly colleague who was eager for our collaboration in order to improve his project. We transmitted the request to the requisite agency authority. Those individuals felt that other senior officials needed to be consulted. A meeting was set with a half dozen senior agency managers to discuss whether such fifteen-minute meeting with colleagues from another agency would be appropriate. One participant in the call expressed deep concern that the other agency’s project might draw attention from our agency’s initiative. The question was tabled for further consideration. Meanwhile, the time slots suggested by the inquiring agency had passed by. 

As with encouraging intelligent risk taking, eliminating silos doesn’t require changes to formal procedure or processes. Senior managers need to encourage collaborative problem-solving and working with other business units, agencies and stake holders in order to increase the amount of information available when reviewing issues and expedite decision making with all knowledgeable staff involved in reviewing possible options. Managers need to be encouraged to meet with other managers. Information gathering meetings with people outside government need to be encouraged, so that government is able to stay up to date with the most current industry information. Senior mangers need to just eliminate the approval structures that create silos. 

It important to note that not every level of the chain of command are required to be at every meeting. Junior managers from various business units and agencies should be able to meet with each other without the need for babysitting from every level of senior manager up the chain. City meetings generally have way too many participants as a result of executives not trusting their subordinates and managers seeking to defend their turf at any meeting that might even tangentially affect their bailiwick. Substantial inefficiencies result from over-staffing of meetings. Over-staffing also makes meetings more difficult to conduct and less likely to come to useful results. The City’s law department is particularly egregious with respect to multiple meeting attendance. The law department in particular would be orders of magnitude more efficient if no more than one, or perhaps two, attorneys were permitted to attend routine meetings, rather than four or five. 

We were pleased with the positive results we were able to achieve when we first entered City service and were able to break down barriers between departments and allow for creative problem solving and collaboration. A lot of good decisions were made, and substantial progress was often achieved. But the more we were required to engage in siloed behavior the more bogged down we became and the less our group was able to accomplish to improve the delivery of public services to the people of the City of New York. 


[1] https://www.engagebay.com/blog/break-silo-mentality-business/

Fortuna Imperatrix Mundi

Fortune rota volvitur;
descendo minoratus;
alter in altum tollitur;
nimis exaltatus
rex sedet in vertice
caveat ruinam!
nam sub axe legimus
Hecubam reginam.

            Underlying just about every issue effecting the functioning of City systems is the manner in which risk is handled. There is uncertainty involved in most, if not, all managerial decisions. We have to evaluate, in conditions of incomplete information, the likelihood of various outcomes, and the positive and/or negative consequences of those decisions. Sometimes, those probabilistic outcomes can be evaluated in monetary terms, and as a result, decision making is more straightforward. But often that it is not the case that the fiscal impact of decisions can be easily calculated. In the public sector negative political or reputational consequences of a judgment can be more important in decision making.

We would argue that flexibility, creativity and problem solving are essential to obtaining optimal public policy outcomes. What we most frequently find in City government is, first, a preference for doing things the way they have always been done, and a second, a preference for avoiding dealing with problems if at all possible. We have also observed that middle, and even senior, managers are generally discouraged from offering new ideas. 

            In the private sector, the evaluation of risk in the course of decision making can be much, much easier. Incentive systems are pegged to positive economic outcomes, either in the short or long term. The better those outcomes, the more reward to the decision maker or organization. Markets, theoretically, reward successful risk taking (and penalize bad bets). The institutional essence of capitalism, the financial markets, are supposedly all about rewarding correct calculations of risk. The public sector has no analogous meta-metric. 

            That being said, we have long wondered about the characteristic risk aversion among public servants. The avoidance of possible negative outcomes of any kind seems to be an essential part of most public decisions making. This has appeared to us as particularly odd, given that most public employees are insulated from negative sanctions by City personnel policies. There are elaborate processes in place, through civil service and otherwise, theoretically to prevent arbitrary personnel decisions. It is a stereotype about government that employees are difficult to fire or otherwise sanction. While these systems don’t protect elected officials and senior bureaucrats, those positions are only a small slice of public employment. In our observation, only very rarely is City employee negatively impacted by a bad business decision or for excessive risk taking. 

            So why is the taking of risk by public servants so seriously avoided? At the highest level, there is a culture among the media of exposing mistakes, without much analysis of the circumstances of the error. This is also a function of a rough and tumble competitive political culture, where there is benefit to elected officials, and the most senior appointed officers, seen in criticizing the mistakes of others. Good faith errors are not differentiated from egregious incompetence by even the respected broadsheet newspaper of record. Tabloid journalists seem particularly focused on publicizing errors. This might be a reason. But of the thousands of decisions made on a day-to-day basis by government workers, most are entirely unlikely to come to public attention. Those decicions just aren’t all that important. But even more mystifying to us is the lack of impact of the media on the public at large. No one really takes the reporting of the New York Postseriously, except for a small group of insiders – elected officials and senior bureaucrats. Post stories, for example, disappear quickly and generally have little to no effect on the voters at large – and yet a series of blistering Post stories, no matter how scurrilous or poorly reported, become part of an insider echo chamber that takes on a life of its own – with little resonance beyond the political class. 

We have also observed that many elected and other senior public officials are principally focused on receiving positive media attention, even from the tabloids (perhaps, particularly from the tabloids) and are obsessively concerned about protecting their downsides from negative situations which might damage their future career prospects. As a result, they micro-manage their agencies, and demand that their subordinates take no risks at all – in order to avoid any possible negative outcomes. While this is a wide-spread practice, it is far from universal and in very large organizations, does not reach down all that far into the bureaucratic depths. There must be some other reason for the almost complete avoidance of risk by all City employees. We don’t regard the prior sentence as hyperbole. It is a precise statement of fact, in our experience. 

            An interesting example is the general risk avoidance of the policy administration of Mayor Bill DeBlasio during his last years in office.  We have observed City Hall’s unwillingness to delegate authority and difficulty in making close decisions. We found this odd, given that the Mayor was not running for re-election and was unlikely to ever hold political office again. We might think that such a situation would provide fertile ground for bold initiatives and the testing of new policies and programs. There would be no political price to be paid by the Administration if any of these projects were to come a cropper. But City Hall continued to operate as if it were engaged in a reelection campaign, with continued fretting about how decisions might be received by the media, other elected officials and the public. It was if having been in campaign mode for the last two decades, since having been first elected to the New York City Council, the Mayor and his senior political and media advisors could not escape operating as if an election was imminent. As a result, opportunities for seriously addressing the kind of issues regarding equity and service to the disadvantaged, about which the Administration obviously cared, were not fully exploited. 

            The explanation for the broad phenomenon of local governmental risk avoidance, we have concluded, has to be that while government workers enjoy broad protections as to their tenure, no positive incentives are in place to promote risk taking within City government. There is no reward for those who carefully calibrate risk, proceed with something untried, and as a result improve government outcomes. The system is structured in such a way as to provide some negative consequences from failure, but no positive results from success. Obviously, there are no financial bonuses awarded for high performance, let along successful risk taking in government. Promotions within the bureaucracy come, generally not from high performance, but from length of tenure (primarily), ingratiation with decision makers (small “p” politics), and an absence of disqualifying blemishes on an employee’s record. As a result, a culture of risk avoidance permeates government service. 

            There are serious negative results from this systematic risk aversion. Change becomes more difficult to implement. Doing the same thing in the same way, no matter how dysfunctional, is simply easier. New ideas are difficult to suggest in a culture that discourages them and are nearly impossible to implement – unless they come from the top. This is a major reason why government is so often unresponsive and sclerotic. We have seen in government a failure to abandon obsolete practices, policies and even metrics, because there is no incentive for doing so, and often loud voices in opposition. With respect to metrics for example, we have seen City agencies insist on continuing to measure things that are no longer relevant (for example, because practices have so improved that the performance being measured meets standards and never varies). Data managers will refuse to alter the metric because “the data will no longer be comparable to past performance,” even though nothing useful is being measured. 

            This is not an unsolvable problem. A culture of intelligent risk taking could be encouraged at all levels of City government. We would suggest that for a Mayor or other senior City official to make a difference in the performance of local government that early in his or her tenure he or she very visibly reward a middle level manager for making an intelligent decision based on a careful analysis of risk – that didn’t pan out. This would send a message across government that implementing smart new programs will be rewarded – regardless of whether they work. The idea is to encourage flexibility and creative problem solving. Better decision making is more a question of leadership than it is of the establishment of new systems or processes.

            The cost is low. In our experience when new initiatives haven’t been successful, the problems created are always relatively easy to solve. In fact, more often than not, even if the initial foray failed, the repair of the failure ultimately produces a superior outcome. Rarely do incorrect decisions as a result of flexibility or creativity in local public administration result in irremediable outcomes. Problems can be fixed. The benefit to the governmental outcomes of empowering managers to solve, rather than avoid, problems would be extraordinary. 

            Serious consideration needs to be given by thoughtful public officials to practices that support local public sector decision makers to find practical solutions to problems. While this sounds straightforward it would require radical cultural change in New York City government. Doing so requires a commitment to improving people’s lives through government and ignoring the noise created by short term carping competitors and the media. Encouraging risk in City government requires taking a long view that over time, aggerate outcomes of high-quality decision making will improve governmental results. 

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